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Abstract
We prove new positive and negative results concerning the existence of truthful and individually
rational mechanisms for purchasing private data from individuals with unbounded and sensitive privacy
preferences. We strengthen the impossibility results of Ghosh and Roth (EC 2011) by extending it to a
much wider class of privacy valuations. In particular, these include privacy valuations that are based on
(ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms for non-zero δ, ones where the privacy costs are measured in a
per-database manner (rather than taking the worst case), and ones that do not depend on the payments
made to players (which might not be observable to an adversary).
To bypass this impossibility result, we study a natural special setting where individuals have mono-
tonic privacy valuations, which captures common contexts where certain values for private data are
expected to lead to higher valuations for privacy (e.g. having a particular disease). We give new mech-
anisms that are individually rational for all players with monotonic privacy valuations, truthful for all
players whose privacy valuations are not too large, and accurate if there are not too many players with
too-large privacy valuations. We also prove matching lower bounds showing that in some respects our
mechanism cannot be improved significantly.
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1 Introduction
Computing over individuals’ private data is extremely useful for various purposes, such as medical or de-
mographic studies. Recent work on differential privacy [DMNS06, Dwo06] has focused on ensuring that
analyses using private data can be carried out accurately while providing individuals a strong quantitative
guarantee of privacy.
While differential privacy provides formal guarantees on how much information is leaked about an
individual’s data, it is silent about what incentivizes the individuals to share their data in the first place.
A recent line of work [MT07, GR11, NST12, Xia13, NOS12, CCK+13, FL12, LR12, RS12] has begun
exploring this question, by relating differential privacy to questions of mechanism design.
One way to incentivize individuals to consent to the usage of their private data is simply to pay them
for using it. For example, a medical study may compensate its participants for the use of their medical
data. However, determining the correct price is challenging: low payments may not draw enough partici-
pants, causing insufficient data for an accurate study, while high payments may be impossible for budgetary
reasons.
Ghosh and Roth [GR11] approached this problem by allowing the mechanism to elicit privacy valuations
from individuals. A privacy valuation is a description of how much disutility an individual experiences from
having information about their private data revealed. By eliciting valuations, the mechanism is hopefully
able to tailor payments to incentivize enough participants to produce an accurate result, while not paying
too much.
1.1 The setting and previous work
We continue the study of purchasing private data from individuals as first proposed by Ghosh and Roth
[GR11] (see [Rot12, PR13] for a survey of this area). Since we work in a game-theoretic framework, we
will also call individuals “players”. As in [GR11], we study the simple case where the private information
consists of a single data bit, which players can refuse to provide but cannot modify (e.g. because the data is
already certified in a trusted database, such as a medical record database).
To determine the price to pay players for their data bits, the mechanism elicits privacy valuations from
them. We study the simple case where each player i’s privacy valuation is parameterized by a single real
parameter vi. For example, in Ghosh and Roth [GR11] they assume that player i loses viε utility when their
data bit is used in an ε-differentially private mechanism. We will study a wider variety of privacy valuation
functions in this paper. The valuations are known only to the players themselves, and therefore players may
report false valuations if it increases their utility. Furthermore, because these valuations may be correlated
with the data bits, the players may wish to keep their valuations private as well. It is instructive to keep in
mind the application of paying for access to medical data (e.g. HIV status), where players cannot control
the actual data bit, but their valuation might be strongly correlated to their data bit.
The goal of the mechanism is to approximate the sum of data bits while not paying too much. Based on
the declared valuations, the mechanism computes payments to each of the players and obtains access to the
purchased data bits from the players that accept the payments. The mechanism then computes and publishes
an approximation to the sum of the data bits, which can cause the players some loss of privacy, which should
be compensated for by the mechanism’s payment.
The mechanism designer aims to achieve three goals, standard in the game theory literature: the mech-
anism should be individually rational, truthful, and accurate. A mechanism is individually rational if all
players receive non-negative utility from participating in the game. In our context, this means that the mech-
anism is sufficiently compensating players for their loss in privacy, something that may be important for
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ethical reasons, beyond just incentivizing participation. Informally, a mechanism is truthful for player i on a
tuple x = (x1, . . . , xn) of reports from the players if player i does not gain in utility by declaring some false
type x′i (while the other players’ types remain unchanged). We aim to build mechanisms that are individu-
ally rational for all players, and truthful for as many players and inputs as possible (ideally for all players
and inputs). A mechanism is accurate if the output of the mechanism is close to the true function it wishes
to compute, in our case the sum of the data bits.
Ghosh and Roth [GR11] study the restricted setting (in their terminology the “insensitive value model”)
where players do not care about leaking their privacy valuations, as well as the general model (the “sensitive
value model”) where they may care and their valuations can be unbounded. They present two mechanisms
in the insensitive value model, one that optimizes accuracy given a fixed budget and another that optimizes
budget given a fixed accuracy constraint. They also prove that their mechanisms are individually rational
and truthful under the assumption that each player i experiences a disutility of exactly viε when his data bit
is used in an ε-differentially private mechanism.
In the general sensitive value model, they prove the following impossibility result: there is no individu-
ally rational mechanism with finite payments that can distinguish between the case where all players have
data bit 0 and the case where all players have data bit 1.
This impossibility result spurred a line of work attempting to bypass it. Fleischer and Lyu [FL12] pro-
pose a Bayesian setting, where (for simplicity considering just Boolean inputs) there are publically known
distributions D0 and D1 over privacy valuations, and each player who has data bit bi receives a valuation vi
drawn from Dbi . They show that in this model, it is possible to build a Bayes-Nash truthful, individually
rational, and accurate mechanism.
In a related work, Roth and Schoenebeck [RS12] study a Bayesian setting where the agents’ actual
(dis)utilities are drawn from a known prior, and construct individually rational and ex-post truthful mecha-
nism that are optimal for minimizing variance given a fixed budget and minimizing expected cost given a
fixed variance goal. In comparison to [FL12], [RS12] studies a disutility value that does not quantitively re-
late to the privacy properties of the mechanism (but rather just a fixed, per-player disutility for participation),
while it results in mechanisms satisfying a stronger notion of truthfulness.
Ligett and Roth [LR12] measure the privacy loss incurred from a player’s decision to participate sepa-
rately from the information leaked about the actual data (effectively ruling out arbitrary correlations between
privacy valuations and data bits). They work in a worst-case (non-Bayesian) model and construct a mech-
anism that satisfies a relaxed “one-sided” notion of truthfulness and accuracy. However, their mechanism
only satisfies individual rationality for players whose privacy valuation is not too high.
1.1.1 Improving the negative results
This line of work leaves several interesting questions open. The first is whether the impossibility result of
[GR11] really closes the door on all meaningful mechanisms when players can have unbounded privacy
valuations that can be arbitrarily correlated with their sensitive data.
There are two important loopholes that the result leaves open. First, their notion of privacy loss is pure
ε-differential privacy, and they crucially use the fact that for pure ε-differentially private mechanisms the
support of the output distribution must be identical for all inputs. This prevents their result from ruling out
notions of privacy loss based on more relaxed notions of privacy, such as (ε, δ)-differential privacy for δ > 0.
As a number of examples in the differential privacy literature show, relaxing to (ε, δ)-differential privacy can
be extremely powerful, even when δ is negligibly small but non-zero [DL09, HT10, DRV10, De12, BNS13].
Furthermore, even (ε, δ) differential privacy measures the worst-case privacy loss over all databases, and it
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may be the case that on most databases, the players’ expected privacy loss is much less than the worst case
bound.1 Thus it is more realistic to use per-database measure of privacy loss (as done in [CCK+13]).
Second, the [GR11] notion of privacy includes as observable and hence potentially disclosive output
the (sum of the) payments made to all the players, not just the sum of the data bits. This leaves open the
possibility of constructing mechanisms for the setting where an outside observer is not able to to see some
of the player’s payments. For example, it may be natural to assume that, when trying to learn about player
i, an observer learns the payments to all players except player i. In the extreme case, we could even restrict
the outside observer to not see any of the payments, but only the approximation to the sum of the data bits.
The Ghosh-Rosh impossibility proof fails in these cases. Indeed in this case where player i’s own payment
is not visible to the observer, there does exist an individually rational and accurate mechanism with finite
payments: simply ask each player for their valuation vi and pay them viε, then output the sum of all the bits
with noise of magnitude O(1/ε). (The reason that this mechanism is unsatisfactory is that it is completely
untruthful — players always gain by reporting a higher valuations.)
We will close both these gaps: our results will hold even under very mild conditions on how the players
experience privacy loss (in particular capturing a per-database analogue of (ε, δ)-differential privacy), and
even when only the approximate count of data bits is observable and none of the payments are observable.
1.1.2 Improving the positive results
Another question left open by the previous work is whether we can achieve individual rationality and some
form of truthfulness under a worst-case setting. Recall that [FL12] and [RS12] work in a Bayesian model,
while [LR12] does not guarantee individual rationality for all players. Furthermore, in both [FL12] and
[RS12] the priors are heavily used in designing the mechanism, and therefore their results break if the
mechanism designer does not accurately know the priors. We will replace the Bayesian assumption with
a simple qualitative assumption on the monotonicity of the correlation between players’ data bits and their
privacy valuation. For accuracy (but not individual rationality), we will assume a rough bound on how many
players exceed a given threshold in their privacy valuations (similarly to [NOS12]).
Another question is the interpretation of the privacy loss functions. We observe that the truthfulness of
the mechanisms in [GR11] crucially relies on the assumption that viε is the exact privacy loss incurred. As
was argued by [NOS12] and [CCK+13], it seems hard to quantify the exact privacy loss a player experiences,
as it may depend on the mechanism, all of the players’ inputs, as well as an adversary’s auxiliary information
about the database. (See footnote 1 for an example.) It is much more reasonable to assume that the privacy
valuations vi declared by the players and the differential privacy parameter ε yield an upper bound on their
privacy loss. When using this interpretation, the truthfulness of [GR11] no longer holds. The mechanisms
we construct will remain truthful using the privacy loss function only as an upper bound on privacy loss
(for players whose privacy valuations are not too large, similarly to the truthfulness guarantees of [NOS12,
CCK+13, LR12]).
1For example, consider a mechanism that computes an ε-differentially private noisy sum of the first n − 1 rows (which we
assume are bits), and if the result is 0, also outputs a ε-differentially private noisy version of the n’th row (e.g. via “randomized
response”). The worst case privacy loss for player n is ε. On databases of the form (0, 0, . . . , 0, b) the first computation results
with 0 with probability ≈ ε and player n suffers ε privacy loss with this probability. However, if it is known that the database is
very unlikely to be almost entirely zero, then player n may experience any privacy loss with only exponentially small probability.
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1.2 Our results
In our model there are n players labelled 1, . . . , n each with a data bit bi ∈ {0, 1} and a privacy valuation
vi ∈ R, which we describe as a 2n-tuple (b, v) ∈ {0, 1}n × Rn. The mechanism designer is interested in
learning (an approximation of)∑ bi. The players may lie about their valuation but they cannot lie about their
data bit. A mechanism M is a pair of randomized functions (Mout,Mpay), where Mout : {0, 1}n×Rn → Z
and Mpay : {0, 1}n × Rn → Rn. Namely Mout produces an integer that should approximate
∑
bi while
Mpay produces payments to each of the n players.
Because the players are privacy-aware, the utility they derive from the game can be separated into two
parts as follows:
utilityi = paymenti − privacy lossi.
(Note that in this paper, we assume the players have no (dis)interest in the integer that Mout produces.) The
privacy loss term will be quantified by a privacy loss function that depends on the identity of the player, his
bit, his privacy valuation, and his declared valuation i, b, v, v′i (where v′i is not necessarily his true type vi),
the mechanism M , and the outcome (s, p) produced by (Mout,Mpay).
Strengthened impossibility result of non-trivial accuracy with privacy. Our first result significantly
strengthens the impossibility result of Ghosh-Roth [GR11].
Theorem 1.1 (Main impossibility result, informal. See Theorem 3.4). Fix any mechanism M and any
reasonable privacy loss functions. Then if M is truthful (even if only for players with privacy valuation
0) and individually rational and makes finite payments to the players (even if only when all players have
privacy valuation 0), then M cannot distinguish between inputs (b, v) = (0n, 0n) and (b′, v) = (1n, 0n).
By “reasonable privacy loss functions,” we mean that if from observing the output of the mechanism on
an input (b, v), an adversary can distinguish the case that player i has data bit bi = 0 from data bit bi = 1
(while keeping all other inputs the same), then player i experiences a significant privacy loss (proportional
to vi) on database (b, v). In particular, we allow for a per-database notion of privacy loss. Moreover, we
only need the adversary to be able to observe the mechanism’s estimate of the count
∑
j bj , and not any of
the payments made to players. And our notion of indistinguishability captures not only pure ε-differential
privacy but also (ε, δ)-differential privacy for δ > 0. The conclusion of the result is as strong as conceivably
possible, stating that M cannot distinguish between the two most different inputs (data bits all 0 vs. data
bits all 1) even in the case where none of the players care about privacy.
We also remark that in our main impossibility result, in order to handle privacy loss functions that
depend only on the distribution of the observable count and not the payment information, we crucially
use the requirement that M be truthful for players with 0 privacy valuation. As we remarked earlier in
Section 1.1.1 there exist M that are individually rational and accurate (but not truthful).
New notions of privacy and positive results. One of the main conceptual contributions of this work is
restricting our attention to a special class of privacy loss functions, which we use to bypass our main impos-
sibility result. Essential to the definition of differential privacy (Definition 2.2) is the notion of neighboring
inputs. Two inputs to the mechanism are considered neighboring if they differ only in the information of
a single player, and in the usual notion of differential privacy, one player’s information may differ arbitrar-
ily. This view also characterized how previous work modeled privacy loss functions: in the sensitive value
model of [GR11], the privacy loss function to a player i on an input (bi, vi) was computed by considering
how much changing to any possible neighbor (b′i, v′i) would affect the output of the mechanism. In contrast,
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we will restrict our attention to privacy loss functions that consider only how much changing to a specific
subset of possible neighbors (b′i, v′i) would affect the output of the mechanism. By restricting to such privacy
loss functions, we can bypass our impossibility results.
We now describe how we restrict (b′i, v′i). Recall that in our setting a single player’s type information
is a pair (bi, vi) where bi ∈ {0, 1} is a data bit and vi ∈ R is a value for privacy. We observe that in many
cases there is a natural sensitive value of the bit bi, for example, if bi represents HIV status, then we would
expect that bi = 1 is more sensitive than bi = 0.
Therefore we consider only the following monotonic valuations: (0, vi) is a neighbor of (1, v′i) iff vi ≤
v′i. Thus, if a player’s true type is (1, v′i), then he is only concerned with how much the output of the
mechanism differs from the case that her actual type were (0, vi) for vi ≤ v′i.
Consider the pairs that we have excluded: any pairs (bi, vi), (bi, v′i) (i.e. the data bit does not change) and
any pairs (0, vi), (1, v′i) where vi > v′i. By excluding these pairs we formally capture the idea that players
are not concerned about revealing their privacy valuations except inasmuch as they may be correlated with
their data bits bi and therefore may reveal something about bi. Since bi = 1 is more sensitive than bi = 0,
the correlation says that privacy valuation when bi = 1 should be larger than when bi = 0. This can be
seen as an intermediate notion between a model where players do not care at all about leaking their privacy
valuation (the insensitive value model of [GR11]), and a model where players care about leaking any and all
information about their privacy valuation (the sensitive value model of [GR11]).
Of course the assumption that players are not concerned about revealing their privacy valuation except
inasmuch as it is correlated with their data is highly context-dependent. There may settings where the privacy
valuation is intrinsically sensitive, independently of the players’ data bits, and in these cases using our notion
of monotonic valuations would be inappropriate. However, we believe that there are many settings where
our relaxation is reasonable.
By using this relaxed notion of privacy, we are able to bypass our main impossibility result and prove
the following:
Theorem 1.2 (Main positive result, informal, see Theorem 4.6). For any fixed budget B and ε > 0, for pri-
vacy loss functions that only depend on how the output distribution changes between monotonic valuations,
there exists a mechanism M that is individually rational for all players and truthful for players with low
privacy valuation (specifically vi ≤ B/2εn). Furthermore, as long as the players with low privacy valua-
tion do indeed behave truthfully, then regardless of the behavior of the players with high privacy valuation,
the mechanism’s output estimates the sum
∑
i bi to within ±(h+O(1/ε)) where h is the number of players
with high privacy valuation.
Note that even though we fix a budget B beforehand and thus cannot make arbitrarily high payments,
we still achieve individual rationality for all players, even those with extremely high privacy valuations vi.
We do so by ensuring that such players experience perfect privacy (εi = 0), assuming they have monotonic
valuations. We also remark that while we do not achieve truthfulness for all players, this is not a significant
problem as long as the number h of players with high privacy valuation is not too large. This is because
the accuracy guarantee holds even if the non-truthful players lie about their valuations. We also give a
small improvement to our mechanism that ensures truthfulness for all players with data bit 0, but at some
additional practical inconvenience; we defer the details to the body of the paper.
We remark that besides our specific restriction to monotonic valuations in this paper, the underlying
principle of studying restricted notions of privacy loss functions by considering only subsets of neighbors
(where the subset should be chosen appropriately based on the specific context) could turn out to be a more
generally meaningful and powerful technique that is useful to bypass impossibility results elsewhere in the
study of privacy.
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Lower bounds on accuracy. The above positive result raises the question: can we adaptively select the
budget B in order to achieve accuracy for all inputs, even those where some players have arbitrarily high
privacy valuations? Recall that Theorem 1.1 does not preclude this because we are now only looking at
monotonic valuations, whereas Theorem 1.1 considers arbitrary valuations. We nevertheless show that it is
impossible:
Theorem 1.3 (Impossibility of accuracy for all privacy valuations, informal, see Theorem 5.3). For reason-
able privacy loss functions that are only sensitive to changes in output distribution of monotonic neighbors,
any M with finite payments that is truthful (even if only on players with 0 privacy valuation) and individu-
ally rational, there exist player privacy valuations v, v′ such that M cannot distinguish between (0n, v) and
(1n, v′).
The exact formal condition on finite payments is somewhat stronger here than in Theorem 1.1, but it
remains reasonable; we defer the formal statement to the body of the paper.
Finally, we also prove a trade-off showing that when there is a limit on the maximum payment the
mechanism makes, then accuracy cannot be improved beyond a certain point, even when considering only
monotonic valuations. We defer the statement of this result to Section 5.2.
1.3 Related work
The relationship between differential privacy and mechanism design was first explored by [MT07]. Besides
the already mentioned works, this relationship was explored and extended in a series of works [NST12],
[Xia13] (see also [Xia11]), [NOS12], [CCK+13] (see also [CCK+11]), [HK12], [KPRU13]. In [MT07,
NST12, HK12, KPRU13], truthfulness refers only to the utility that players derive from the outcome of
the game (as in standard mechanism design) and differential privacy is treated as a separate property. The
papers [Xia13, NOS12, CCK+13] study whether and when such mechanisms, which are separately truthful
and differentially private, remain truthful even if the players are privacy-aware and may incur some loss in
utility from the leakage of the private information. Differential privacy has also been used as a technical tool
to solve problems that are not necessarily immediately obvious as being privacy-related; the original work of
[MT07] does this, by using differential privacy to construct approximately truthful and optimal mechanisms,
while more recently, [KPRU13] use differential privacy as a tool to compute approximate equilibria. For
more details, we refer the reader to the recent surveys of [Rot12, PR13].
Two ideas we draw on from this literature (particularly [NOS12, CCK+13]) are (1) the idea that privacy
loss cannot be used as a threat because we do not know if a player will actually experience the maximal
privacy loss possible, and therefore we should treat privacy loss functions only as upper bounds on the actual
privacy loss, and (2) the idea that it is meaningful to construct mechanisms that are truthful for players
with reasonable privacy valuations and accurate if most players satisfy this condition. Our mechanisms
are truthful not for all players but only for players with low privacy valuation; it will be accurate if the
mechanism designer knows enough about the population to set a budget such that most players have low
privacy valuation (with respect to the budget).
2 Definitions
2.1 Notation
For two distributions X,Y we let ∆(X,Y ) denote their total variation distance (i.e. statistical distance).
For an integer i let [i] = {1, . . . , i}. For any set S and any vector v ∈ Sn, we let v−i ∈ Sn−1 denote the
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vector v1, . . . , vi−1, vi+1, . . . , vn. We use the following convention: a vector of n entries consisting of n−1
variables or constants followed by an indexed variable denotes the vector of n entries with the last variable
inserted at its index. For example e.g. (0n−1, vi) denotes the vector with all zeros except at the i’th entry,
which contains vi. Some notation about the setting regarding mechanisms etc. was already introduced in
Section 1.2.
2.2 Differential privacy
Definition 2.1. Two inputs (b, v), (b′, v′) ∈ {0, 1}n × Rn are i-neighbors if bj = b′j and vj = v′j for all
j 6= i. They are neighbors if they are i-neighbors for some i ∈ [n].
Definition 2.2. A randomized function f is (ε, δ)-differentially private if for all neighbors (b, v), (b′, v′), it
holds that for all subsets S of the range of f :
Pr[f(b, v) ∈ S] ≤ eε Pr[f(b′, v′) ∈ S] + δ. (2.1)
We say f is ε-differentially private if it is (ε, 0)-differentially private.
The symmetric geometric random variable Geom(ε) takes integer values with probability mass function
Prx←RGeom(ε)[x = k] ∝ e
−ε|k| for all k ∈ Z. It is well-known and easy to verify that for b ∈ {0, 1}n, the
output
∑
bi +Geom(ε) is ε-differentially private.
2.3 Privacy loss functions
A privacy loss function for player i is a real-valued function λ(M)i (b, v, v′i, s, p−i) taking as inputs the vec-
tors of all player types b, v, player i’s declaration v′i (not necessarily equal to vi), and a possible outcome
(s, p−i) ∈ Z × R
n−1 of M . The function also depends on the mechanism M = (Mout,Mpay). Finally we
define
Loss
(M)
i (b, v, v
′
i) = E(s,p)←RM(b,(v−i,v′i))[λ
(M)
i (b, v, v
′
i, s, p−i)]. (2.2)
Observe that we have excluded player i’s own payment from the output, as we will assume that an
outside observer cannot see player i’s payment. We let M−i denote the randomized function M−i(b, v) =
(Mout(b, v),Mpay(b, v)−i).
We comment that, in contrast to [CCK+13], we allow λ(M)i to depend on the player’s declaration v′i to
model the possibility that a player’s privacy loss depends on his declaration. Allowing this dependence
only strengthens our positive results, while our negative results hold even if we exclude this dependence on
v′i. We remark that even if λ
(M)
i doesn’t depend on v′i, then Loss
(M)
i will still depend on v′i, since it is an
expectation over the output distribution of Mout(b, (v−i, v′i)). (See Equation 2.2).)
Since the choice of a specific privacy loss function depends heavily on the context of the mechanism
being studied, we avoid fixing a single privacy loss function and rather study several reasonable properties
that privacy loss functions should have. Also, while we typically think of privacy valuation as being positive
and privacy losses as positive, our definition does not exclude the possibility that players may want to lose
their privacy, and therefore we allow privacy valuations (and losses) to be negative. Our impossibility results
will only assume non-negative privacy loss, while our constructions handle possibly negative privacy loss
functions as long as the absolute value of the privacy loss function is bounded appropriately.
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2.4 Mechanism design criteria
Definition 2.3. A mechanism M = (Mout,Mpay) is ([α,α′], β)-accurate on an input (b, v) ∈ {0, 1}n×Rn
if, setting b = 1
n
∑n
i=1 bi, it holds that
Pr[Mout(b, v) /∈ ((b− α)n, (b + α
′)n)] ≤ β.
We say that M is (α, β)-accurate on (b, v) if it is ([α,α], β)-accurate.
We define Pay(M)i (b, v) = Ep←RMpay(b,v)[pi].
Definition 2.4. Fix n, a mechanism M on n players, and privacy loss functions λ(M)1 , . . . , λ
(M)
n . We say M
is individually rational if for all inputs (b, v) ∈ {0, 1}n × Rn and all i ∈ [n]:
Pay
(M)
i (b, v) ≥ Loss
(M)
i (b, v, vi).
M is truthful for input (b, v) and player i if for all v′i it holds that
Pay
(M)
i (b, v) − Loss
(M)
i (b, v, vi) ≥ Pay
(M)(b, (v−i, v
′
i))− Loss
(M)
i (b, v, v
′
i).
M is simply truthful if it is truthful for all inputs and all players.
3 Impossibility of non-trivial accuracy with privacy
We will use a notion of distinguishability that captures when a function leaks information about an input
pertaining to a particular player.
Definition 3.1. An input (b, v) ∈ {0, 1}n×Rn is δ-distinguishable for player i with respect to a randomized
function f if there is an i-neighbor (b′, v′) such that ∆(f(b, v), f(b′, v′)) ≥ δ.
We choose a notion based on statistical distance because it allows us to capture (ε, δ)-differential privacy
even for δ > 0. Namely, if there is an input (b, v) ∈ {0, 1}n × Rn that is δ-distinguishable for player i with
respect to f , then f cannot be (ε, δ′)-differentially private for any ε, δ′ satisfying δ > δ′ + eε − 1 ≈ δ′ + ε.
However, note that, unlike differential privacy, δ-distinguishability is a per-input notion, measuring how
much privacy loss a player can experience on a particular input (b, v), not taking the worst case over all
inputs.
For our impossibility result we will require that any specified privacy loss should be attainable if the
player’s privacy valuation is large enough, as long as there is in fact a noticeable amount of information
about the player’s type being leaked (i.e. the player’s input is somewhat distinguishable). Note that having
unbounded privacy losses is necessary for having any kind of negative result. If the privacy losses were
always upper-bounded by some value L, then a trivially truthful and individually rational mechanism would
simply pay every player L and output the exact sum of data bits.
Definition 3.2. A privacy loss function λ(M)i for a mechanism M and player i is increasing for δ-distin-
guishability if there exists a real-valued function Ti such that for all ℓ > 0, b ∈ {0, 1}n and v−i ∈ Rn−1, if
vi ≥ Ti(ℓ, b, v−i) and if (b, v) is δ-distinguishable for player i with respect to Mout, then Loss(M)i (b, v, vi) >
ℓ.
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Notice that in our notion of increasing for δ-distinguishability we only consider distinguishability for
Mout and not for (Mout,Mpay). Being able to handle this definition is what makes our impossibility rule out
mechanisms even for privacy loss functions depending only on the distribution of Mout.
Definition 3.2 implies that the privacy loss functions are unbounded. We next define a natural property
of loss functions, that for privacy-indifferent players privacy loss is not affected by the particular value
reported for vi.
Definition 3.3. A privacy loss function λ(M)i for a mechanism M and player i respects indifference if
whenever vi = 0 it follows that Loss(M)i (b, v, v′i) = Loss
(M)
i (b, v, v
′′
i ) for all v′i, v′′i .
Theorem 3.4. Fix a mechanism M and a number of players n, and non-negative privacy loss functions
λ
(M)
1 , . . . , λ
(M)
n . Suppose that the λ(M)i respect indifference, and are increasing for δ-distinguishability for
some δ ≤ 16n .
Suppose that M that satisfies all of the following:
• M is individually rational.
• M has finite payments when all players are privacy-indifferent, in the sense that for all b ∈ {0, 1}n
and all i ∈ [n], it holds that Pay(M)i (b, 0n) is finite.
• M is truthful for privacy-indifferent players, namely M is truthful for all inputs (b, v) and players i
such that vi = 0.
Then it follows that M cannot have non-trivial accuracy in the sense that it cannot be (1/2, 1/3)-accurate
on (0n, 0n) and (1n, 0n).
Proof. We write Payi, Lossi, λi to denote Pay(M)i , Loss(M)i , λ(M)i . By the assumption that M has finite
payments when all players are privacy-indifferent, we can define
P = max
i∈[n],b∈{0,1}n
Payi(b, 0
n) <∞.
By the assumption that all the λi are increasing for δ-indistinguishability, we may define a threshold
L = max
i∈[n],b∈{0,1}n
Ti(P, b, 0
n−1)
such that for all i ∈ [n], b ∈ {0, 1}n, vi ≥ L, it holds that if (b, (0n−1, vi)) is δ-distinguishable, then
Lossi(b, (0
n−1, vi), vi) > P .
We construct a sequence of 2n+1 inputs x(1,0), x(1,1), x(2,0), x(2,1), . . . , x(n,0), x(n,1), x(n+1,0). In x(1,0),
all players have data bit 0 and privacy valuation 0. That is, x(1,0) = (0n, 0n). From x(i,0), we construct x(i,1)
by changing player i’s data bit bi from 0 to 1 and valuation vi from 0 to L. From x(i,1), we construct x(i+1,0)
by changing player i’s valuation vi back from L to 0 (but bi remains 1). Thus,
x(i,0) = ((1i−1, 0, 0n−i), (0i−1, 0, 0n−i)), and
x(i,1) = ((1i−1, 1, 0n−i), (0i−1, L, 0n−i))
In particular, x(n+1,0) = (1n, 0n). Define the hybrid distributions H(i,j) = Mout(x(i,j)).
Claim 3.5. For all i ∈ [n], Payi(x(i,1)) ≤ Payi(x(i+1,0)) ≤ P .
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To prove this claim, we first note that all players have privacy valuation 0 in x(i+1,0), so Payi(x(i+1,0)) ≤
P by the definition of P . Since player i has privacy valuation 0 in x(i+1,0), we also know that privacy loss
of player i in input x(i+1,0) is independent of her declaration (since λi respects indifference). If player i
declares L as her valuation instead of 0, she would get payment Payi(x(i,1)). By truthfulness for privacy-
indifferent players, we must have Payi(x(i,1)) ≤ Payi(x(i+1,0)).
By the definition of L it follows that x(i,1) cannot be δ-distinguishable for player i with respect to Mout.
Otherwise, this would contradict individual rationality because on input x(i,1) player i would have privacy
loss > P while only getting payoff ≤ P .
Since x(i,1) is not δ-distinguishable for player i with respect to Mout, and because x(i,1) is an i-neighbor
of x(i,0) as well as x(i+1,0), it follows that
∆(H(i,0),H(i,1)) < δ and ∆(H(i,1),H(i+1,0)) < δ (3.1)
Finally, since Equation 3.1 holds for all i ∈ [n], and since H(1,0) = Mout(0n, 0n) and H(n+1,0) =
Mout(1
n, 0n), we have by the triangle inequality that
∆(Mout(0
n, 0n),Mout(1
n, 0n)) < 2nδ
But since δ ≤ 1/6n, this contradicts the fact that M has non-trivial accuracy, since non-trivial accuracy
implies that we can distinguish between the output of Mout on inputs (0n, 0n) and (1n, 0n) with advantage
greater than 1/3, simply by checking whether the output is greater than n/2.
3.1 Subsampling for low-distinguishability privacy loss functions
We comment that the δ ≤ 1/6n bound in Theorem 3.4 is tight up to a constant factor. Indeed, if players
do not incur significant losses when their inputs are O(1/n)-distinguishable, then an extremely simple
mechanisms based on sub-sampling can be used to achieve truthfulness, individual rationality, and accuracy
with finite budget.
Namely, suppose that the privacy loss functions are such that if for all i, if player i’s input is not C/n-
distinguishable for some constant C , then regardless of vi, the loss to player i is bounded by P . Then the
following mechanism is truthful, individually rational, and accurate: pay all players P , select at random a
subset A of size k for some k < C from the population, and output (n/|A|) ·
∑
i∈A bi. By a Chernoff
Bound, this mechanism is (η, 2e−η2k)-accurate for all η > 0. By construction no player’s input is C/n-
distinguishable and therefore their privacy loss is at most P and the mechanism is individually rational.
Finally mechanism is truthful since it behaves independently of the player declarations.
4 Positive results
For our positive results, we will require the following natural property from our privacy loss functions.
Recall that we allow the privacy loss functions λ(M)i to depend on a player’s report v′i, in addition the the
player’s true type. We require the dependence on v′i to be well-behaved in that if changing declarations does
not change the output distribution, then it also does not change the privacy loss.
Definition 4.1. A privacy loss function λ(M)i respects identical output distributions if the following holds:
for all b, v, if the distribution of M−i(b, v) is identical to M−i(b, (v−i, v′i)), then for all s, p, it holds that
λ
(M)
i (b, v, v
′
i, s, p) = λ
(M)
i (b, v, vi, s, p).
The above definition captures the idea that if what the privacy adversary can see (namely the output of
M−i) doesn’t change, then player i’s privacy loss should not change.
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4.1 Monotonic valuations
We now define our main conceptual restriction of the privacy loss functions to consider only monotonic
valuations.
Definition 4.2. Two player types (bi, vi), (b′i, v′i) ∈ {0, 1} × R are said to be monotonically related iff
(bi = 0, b′i = 1, and vi ≤ v′i) or (bi = 1, b′i = 0, and vi ≥ v′i). Two inputs (b, v), (b′, v′) ∈ {0, 1}n ×Rn are
monotonic i-neighbors if they are i-neighbors and furthermore (bi, vi), (b′i, v′i) are monotonically related.
They are monotonic neighbors if they are monotonic i-neighbors for some i ∈ [n].
Following [CCK+13], we also make the assumption that the privacy loss functions on a given output
(s, p−i) are bounded by the amount of influence that player i’s report has on the probability of the output:
Definition 4.3. A privacy loss function λ(M)i is bounded by differential privacy if the following holds:
∣∣∣λ(M)i (b, v, v′i, s, p−i)
∣∣∣ ≤ vi ·
(
max
(b′′
i
,v′′
i
)
log
Pr[M−i(b, v) = (s, p−i)]
Pr[M−i((b−i, b′′i ), (v−i, v
′′
i )) = (s, p−i)]
)
A privacy loss function λ(M)i is bounded by differential privacy for monotonic valuations if:
∣∣∣λ(M)i (b, v, v′i, s, p−i)
∣∣∣ ≤ vi ·
(
max
(b′′
i
,v′′
i
) mon. related to (bi,vi)
log
Pr[M−i(b, v) = (s, p−i)]
Pr[M−i((b−i, b
′′
i ), (v−i, v
′′
i )) = (s, p−i)]
)
As noted and used in [CCK+13], the RHS in the above definition can be upper-bounded by the level of
(pure) differential privacy, and the same holds for monotonic valuations:
Fact 4.4. If M−i is ε-differentially private for i-neighbors (i.e. Equation 2.1 holds for all i-neighbors) and
λ
(M)
i is bounded by differential privacy (even if only for monotonic valuations), then player i’s privacy loss
is bounded by viε regardless of other player types, player declarations, or outcomes.
As hinted at in the definition of privacy loss functions bounded by differential privacy for monotonic
valuations, one can define an analogue of differential privacy where we take the maximum over just mono-
tonically related neighbors. However this notion is not that different from the original notion of differential
privacy, since satisfying such a definition for some privacy parameter ε immediately implies satisfying
(standard) differential privacy for privacy parameter 3ε, since every two pairs (bi, vi) and (b′i, v′i) are at
distance at most 3 in the monotonic-neighbor graph. The monotonic neighbor notion becomes more in-
teresting if we consider a further variant of differential privacy where the privacy guarantee εi afforded to
an individual depends on her data (bi, vi) (e.g. εi = 1/vi). We defer exploration of this notion to a future
version of this paper.
4.2 Mechanism for monotonic valuations
The idea behind our mechanism for players with monotic valuations (Algorithm 4.5) is simply to treat the
data bit as 0 (the insensitive value) for all players who value privacy too much.
Theorem 4.6. For privacy loss functions that are bounded by differential privacy for monotonic valuations
and respect identical output distributions, the mechanism M in Algorithm 4.5 satisfies the following:
1. M is truthful for all players with 2εvi ≤ B/n.
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Input: (b, v) ∈ {0, 1}n × Rn. Auxiliary inputs: budget B > 0, privacy parameter ε > 0.
1. For all i ∈ [n], set b′i = bi if 2εvi ≤ B/n, otherwise set b′i = 0.
2. Output
∑n
i=1 b
′
i +Geom(ε).
3. Pay B/n to player i if 2εvi ≤ B/n, else pay player i nothing.
Algorithm 4.5. Mechanism for monotonic valuations
2. M is individually rational for all players
3. Assume only that the truthful players described in Point 1 do indeed declare their true types. Letting η
denote the fraction of players where bi = 1 and 2εvi > B/n, it holds that M is ([η + γ, γ], 2e−εγn)-
accurate.
Proof. Truthfulness for players with 2εvi ≤ B/n: if 2εvi ≤ B/n, then declaring any v′i ≤ B/(2εn)
has no effect on the output of the mechanism, and so there is no change in utility since the privacy loss
functions respect identical output distributions. If player i declares some v′i > B/(2εn), then he loses B/n
in payment. Because M−i is ε-differentially private if for i-neighbors (recall we assume an observer cannot
see the change in pi) and we assumed that the privacy loss functions are bounded by differential privacy for
monotonic valuations, it follows that player i’s privacy loss has absolute value at most 2εvi under a report
of vi and under a report of v′i (Fact 4.4). Thus, there is at most a change of 2εvi in privacy, which is not
sufficient to overcome the payment loss of B/n.
Individual rationality: consider any vector of types b, v and any player i. If vi ≤ B/2εn then player i
receives payment B/n. By the hypothesis that the privacy loss functions are bounded by differential privacy
for monotonic valuations, and because the mechanism is ε-differentially private, the privacy loss to player i
is bounded by εvi < B/n (Fact 4.4), satisfying individual rationality.
Now suppose that player i has valuation vi > B2εn . In this case the payment is 0. The mechanism sets
b′i = 0, and for every (b′′i , v′′i ) monotonically related to (bi, vi) the mechanism also sets b′i = 0. Since the
report of player i does not affect b′j or the payment to player j for j 6= i, monotonic neighbors will produce
the exact same output distribution of M−i.
Therefore the privacy loss of player i is 0. Indeed, since the privacy loss function is bounded by differ-
ential privacy for monotonic valuations, we have:
∣∣∣λ(M)i (b, v, v′i, s, p−i)
∣∣∣ ≤ vi ·
(
max
(b′′
i
,v′′
i
) mon. related to (bi,vi)
log
Pr[M−i(b, v) = (s, p−i)]
Pr[M−i((b−i, b′′i ), (v−i, v
′′
i )) = (s, p−i)]
)
= 0
Accuracy: the bits of the (1−η) fraction of truthful players and players with bi = 0 are always counted
correctly, while the bits of the η fraction of players with bi = 1 and large privacy valuation vi ≥ B/(2εn)
are either counted correctly (if they declare a value less than B/(2εn)) or are counted as 0 (if they declare
otherwise).
This means that b′ =
∑n
i=1 b
′
i and b =
∑n
i=1 bi satisfy b′ ∈ [b− ηn, b′].
By the definition of symmetric geometric noise, it follows that (letting v′ be the declared valuations of
the players) it holds that
Pr[|Mout(b, v
′)− b′| ≥ γn] < 2e−εγn.
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The theorem follows.
4.2.1 Achieving better truthfulness
We can improve the truthfulness of Theorem 4.6 to include all players with data bit 0.
Theorem 4.7. Let M ′ be the same as in Algorithm 4.5, except that all players with bi = 0 are paid B/n,
even those with large privacy valuations. Suppose that the λ(M
′)
i are bounded by differential privacy for
monotonic valuations and also respect identical output distributions. Then the conclusions of Theorem 4.6
hold and in addition the mechanism is truthful for all players with data bit bi = 0.
Note that, unlike Algorithm 4.5, here the payment that the mechanism makes to players depends on their
data bit, and not just on their reported valuation. This might make it impractical in some settings (e.g. if
payment is needed before players give permission to view their data bits).
Proof. Increasing the payments to the players with bi = 0 and privacy valuation vi > B2εn does not hurt
individual rationality or accuracy. We must however verify that we have not harmed truthfulness. Since
players are not allowed to lie about their data bit, the same argument for truthfulness of players with bi = 1
and vi ≤ B/(2εn) remains valid. It is only necessary to verify that truthfulness holds for all players with
bi = 0.
Observe that for players with bi = 0, the output distribution of the mechanism is identical regardless
of their declaration for vi. Therefore by the assumption that the λ(M)i respect identical output distributions,
changing their declaration does not change their privacy loss. Furthermore, by the definition of M ′ changing
their declaration does not change their payment as all players with bi = 0 are paid B/n. Therefore, there is
no advantage to declaring a false valuation.
We remark that Theorem 4.7 is only preferable to Theorem 4.6 in settings where knowing the true valu-
ations has some value beyond simply helping to achieve an accurate output; in particular, notice that M ′ as
defined in Theorem 4.7 does not guarantee any better accuracy or any lower payments (indeed, it may make
more payments than the original Algorithm 4.5).
5 Lower bounds
5.1 Impossibility of non-trivial accuracy for all privacy valuations with monotonic privacy
One natural question that Algorithm 4.5 raises is whether we can hope to adaptively set the budget B based
on the valuations of the players and thereby achieve accuracy for all inputs, not just inputs where most
players’ privacy valuations are small relative to some predetermined budget. In this section we show that
this is not possible, even when only considering players who care about privacy for monotonic neighbors.
Definition 5.1. An input (b, v) ∈ {0, 1}n ×Rn is δ-monotonically distinguishable for player i with respect
to a randomized function f if there is a monotonic i-neighbor (b′, v′) such that ∆(f(b, v), f(b′, v′)) ≥ δ.
Definition 5.2. A privacy loss function λ(M)i for a mechanism M and player i is increasing for δ-monotonic
distinguishability if there exists a real-valued function Ti such that for all ℓ > 0, b ∈ {0, 1}n and v−i ∈
R
n−1
, if vi ≥ Ti(ℓ, b, v−i) and if (b, v) is δ-monotonically distinguishable for player i with respect to Mout,
then Loss(M)i (b, v, vi) > ℓ.
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Theorem 5.3. Fix a mechanism M and a number of players n, and non-negative privacy loss functions
λ
(M)
1 , . . . , λ
(M)
n . Suppose that the λ(M)i respect indifference and are increasing for δ-monotonic distin-
guishability for δ ≤ 13n .
Suppose M satisfies all the following:
• M is individually rational.
• M always has finite payments, in the sense that for all b ∈ {0, 1}n, v ∈ Rn and all i ∈ [n] it holds
that Pay(M)i (b, v) is finite.
• M is truthful for privacy-indifferent players, as in Theorem 3.4
Then M does not have non-trivial accuracy for all privacy valuations, namely M cannot be (1/2, 1/3)-
accurate on (0n, v) and (1n, v) for all v ∈ Rn.
Proof. The argument follows the same outline as the proof of Theorem 3.4, i.e. by constructing a sequence
of hybrid inputs and using truthfulness for privacy-indifferent players and individual rationality to argue
that the neighboring hybrids must produce statistically close outputs. However, we have to take more care
here because for the hybrids in this proof there is no uniform way to set the maximum payment P and
threshold valuation L for achieving privacy loss > P at the beginning of the argument, since here we allow
the finite payment bound to depend on the valuations (whereas Theorem 3.4 only refers to the payment
bound when all valuations are zero). Instead, we set Pi, Li for the i’th hybrids in a way that depends on
L[i−1] = (L1, . . . , Li−1).
As before, we have 2n+1 inputs x(1,0), x(1,1), x(2,0), x(2,1), . . . , x(n,0), x(n,1), x(n+1,0), which we define
inductively as follows. In x(1,0), all players have data bit 0 and privacy valuation 0. That is, x(1,0) = (0n, 0n).
From x(i,0), we define x(i,1) by changing player i’s data bit from 0 to 1. From x(i,1) = (b(i), v(i)), we
define Pi = Payi(x(i,1)) to be the amount that player i is paid in x(i,1), and Li = Ti(Pi, b(i), v
(i)
−i) to be a
privacy valuation beyond which payment Pi does not compensate for δ-distinguishability (as promised by
Definition 5.2). Then we define x(i+1,0) by increasing the valuation of player i from 0 to Li. By induction,
for i = 1, . . . , n+ 1, we have
x(i,0) = (1i−10n−i+1, L[i−1]0
n−i+1).
Define the distribution H(i) = Mout(x(i,0)).
Claim 5.4. Payi(x(i+1,0)) ≤ Payi(x(i,1)) = Pi
On input x(i,1), player i has privacy valuation 0, so his privacy loss is independent of his declaration
(since λi respects indifference). Declaring Li would change the input to x(i+1,0), so by truthfulness for
privacy-indifferent players, we have Payi(x(i+1,0)) ≤ Payi(x(i,1)).
By the definition of Li, x(i+1,0) cannot be δ-monotonically distinguishable for player i with respect to
Mout. Otherwise, this would contradict individual rationality because on input x(i+1,0) player i would have
privacy loss greater than Pi while only getting a payoff of at most Pi (by Claim 5.4).
Since x(i+1,0) is not δ-monotonically distinguishable for player i with respect to Mout, and because
x(i,0) is an i-monotonic neighbor of x(i+1,0), it follows that ∆(H(i−1),H(i)) < δ. Finally, since this holds
for all i ∈ [n], the triangle inequality implies that ∆(H(0),H(n)) < nδ. But since δ ≤ 1/3n, this implies
that
∆(Mout(0
n, 0n),Mout(1
n, L)) < 1/3
contradicting the fact that M has non-trivial accuracy for all privacy valuations.
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5.2 Tradeoff between payments and accuracy
One could also ask whether the accuracy of Theorem 4.6 can be improved, i.e. whether it is possible to beat
(η + γ, 2e−εγn)-accuracy. We now present a result that, assuming the mechanism does not exceed a certain
amount of payment, limits the best accuracy it can achieve. (We note however that this bound is loose and
does not match our mechanism.)
In order to prove optimality we will require that the privacy loss functions be growing with statistical
distance, which is a strictly stronger condition than being increasing for δ-distinguishability. However, a
stronger requirement is unavoidable since one can invent contrived privacy loss functions that are increasing
but for which one can achieve (η, 0)-accuracy by simply by outputting
∑
b′i as constructed in Algorithm 4.5
without noise (while preserving the same truthfulness and individual rationality guarantees). Nevertheless,
being growing with statistical distance for monotonic neighbors is compatible with being bounded by differ-
ential privacy for monotonic neighbors (i.e. there exist functions that satisfy both properties), and therefore
the following result still implies limits to how much one can improve the accuracy of Theorem 4.6 for all
privacy loss functions bounded by differential privacy for monotonic neighbors.
Definition 5.5. λ(M)i (b, v, v′i, s, p−i) is growing with statistical distance (for monotonic neighbors) if:
Loss
(M)
i (b, v, vi) ≥ vi ·
(
max
(b′,v′)
∆(Mout(b, v),Mout(b
′, v′))
)
where the maximum is taken over (b′, v′) that are (monotonic) i-neighbors of (b, v).
Theorem 5.6. Fix a mechanism M , a number of players n, and privacy loss functions λ(M)i for i = 1, . . . , n.
Suppose that the λ(M)i respect indifference and are growing with statistical distance for monotonic neigh-
bors.
Suppose that M satisfies the following:
• M is individually rational.
• There exists a maximum payment over all possible inputs that M makes to any player who declares 0
privacy valuation. Call this maximum value P .
• M is truthful for privacy-indifferent players as defined in Theorem 3.4.
Then it holds that for any τ, γ, η > 0 such that η + 2γ ≤ 1, and any β < 12 − Pτ γn, the mechanism M
cannot be ([η+γ, γ], β)-accurate on all inputs where at most an η fraction of the players’ valuations exceed
τ .
Proof. Fix any τ, η, γ > 0 and any β < 12 − Pτ γn. We prove the theorem by showing that M cannot be
([η + γ, γ], β)-accurate. Let h = ηn denote the number of players with high privacy valuation allowed.
Fix any L ≥ Ph/(1 − 2P
τ
γn − 2β). Consider the following sequence of hybrid inputs. Let x(1,0) =
(0n, 0n). From x(i,0), define x(i,1) by flipping player i’s data bit from 0 to 1. From x(i,1), define x(i+1,0) by
increasing the valuation of player i from 0 to L if i ∈ [h+1], or from 0 to τ if i ∈ (h+1, h+2γn+1]. By
induction, we have:
∀i ∈ [h+ 1], x(i,0) = (1i−10n−i+1, Li−10n−i+1)
∀i ∈ (h+ 1, h + 2γn+ 1], x(i,0) = (1i−10n−i+1, Lhτ i−h−10n−i+1)
These are well-defined since h + 2γ = (η + 2γ)n ≤ n. Define the hybrids H(i,0) = Mout(x(i,0)). To
analyze these hybrids, we use the following claims.
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Claim 5.7. For any input (b, v) where player i is paid at most P , it holds that (b, v) is not δ-distinguishable
for monotonic neighbors for player i with respect to Mout for any δ ≥ P/vi.
Claim 5.7 holds because by individual rationality, it holds that the privacy loss does not exceed P . By
the assumption that the privacy loss functions are growing with statistical distance for monotonic neighbors,
it follows that ∆(Mout(b, v),Mout(b′, v′)) ≤ P/vi for all (b′, v′) monotonic neighbors of (b, v).
Claim 5.8. Payi(x(i+1,0)) ≤ Payi(x(i,1)) ≤ P .
As in the proof of Theorem 5.3, this claim holds because on input x(i,1), player i + 1 has 0 privacy
valuation, and so Payi(x(i,1)) ≤ P by our assumption that the mechanism pays at most P to players with 0
privacy valuation. Payi(x(i+1,0)) ≤ Payi(x(i,1)) follows as in the proof of Theorem 5.3 from the truthfulness
of the mechanism for privacy-indifferent players and by the fact that the privacy loss functions respect
indifference.
We may apply Claim 5.7 to conclude that for all i ∈ [h], since player i has valuation L in x(i+1,0), it holds
that x(i+1,0) cannot be (P/L)-distinguishable for monotonic neighbors for player i. Since x(i,0), x(i+1,0) are
monotonic i-neighbors, it follows that ∆(H(i,0),H(i+1,0)) < P/L.
Repeating the same argument for all i ∈ [h+ 1, h + 2γn] and using the fact that player i has valuation
τ in x(i+1,0) for these i, it follows that ∆(H(i,0),H(i+1,0)) < P/τ .
Combining the above using the triangle inequality and applying the definition of L, we deduce that
∆(H(1,0),H(h+2γn+1,0)) <
ηnP
L
+
2γnP
τ
≤ 1− 2β (5.1)
For i ∈ [n], define the open interval on the real line A(i) = (i − 1 − (η + γ)n, i − 1 + γn). Since the
sum of the data bits in x(i,0) is exactly i−1, in order for M to be ([η+γ, γ], β)-accurate, it is necessary that
Pr[H(i) ∈ A(i)] > 1− β for all i ∈ [h+ 2γn + 1] (5.2)
Observe that A(1) and A(h+ 2γn+ 1) are disjoint. Therefore, Equation 5.1 implies that
Pr[H(1,0) ∈ A(1)] < Pr[H(h+2γn+1,0) ∈ A(1)] + 1− 2β
By Equation 5.2 it follows that Pr[H(h+2γn+1,0) ∈ A(1)] < β and therefore from the previous inequality
we deduce that Pr[H(1,0) ∈ A(1)] < 1− β. But this contradicts Equation 5.2, and therefore it must be the
case that M is not ([η + γ, γ], β)-accurate.
Remark 5.9. A different way to evaluate the accuracy guarantee of our mechanism, (the one taken in the
work of Ghosh and Roth [GR11]) would be to compare it to the optimal accuracy achievable in the class of
all envy-free mechanisms with budget B. However, in our context it is not clear how to define envy-freeness:
while it is clear what it means for player i to receive player j’s payment, it is not at all clear (without making
further assumptions) how to define the privacy loss of player i as if he were treated like player j, since this
loss may depend on the functional relationship between the player i’s type and the output of the mechanism.
Because of this, our mechanism may not envy-free (for reasonable privacy loss functions), and so we refrain
from using envy-free mechanisms as a benchmark.
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